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Abstract 
How do voters react to electoral incentives for strategic voting when presidential and 
parliamentary elections are held concurrently and under different systems? Previous research has 
concluded that different systems can shape the preferences of voters and create different 
incentives to vote strategically, yet the effect of the concurrent presidential and parliamentary 
elections is still unclear. This study analyzes the incentives in such a setting in a case study of 
Turkey. By employing King’s ecological inference solution and using ballot-box level data, this 
article shows that 9 percent of total voters cast a strategic vote in the 2018 elections. Moreover, if 
supporters of the two main parties are excluded from the analysis, as they had no reason to vote 
strategically because their most preferred candidate was perceived to be one of the top two 
contenders, the percentage of strategic voters increases to 25 percent. 
 
Keywords: strategic voting, split-ticket voting, ecological inference, Turkey, voting behavior. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is generally assumed that voters cast their ballots for their preferred 
party, and that election results are a clear reflection of those preferences. 
However, voters can deviate from this assumption, acting as rational agents 
under certain conditions.
1
 The strategic voting model has made an important 
contribution to the field of electoral behavior by presenting meaningful 
explanations for why some people deviate from the behavioral assumptions of 
the classical models. It asserts that if a voter believes that voting for a less-
preferred party will likely result in a more favorable outcome, then rationality 
commands the voter to cast a “strategic” vote for that party.
2
 Strategic voters 
                                               
*  Betül Aydoğan Ünal is a Research Assistant at the Department of International Relations, 
Ege University, Turkey (betul.aydogan@ege.edu.tr). 
1  Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral 
Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71. 
2  Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 
48; John H. Aldrich, André Blais and Laura B. Stephenson, “Strategic Voting and 
Political Institutions,” in The Many Faces of Strategic Voting: Tactical Behavior in 
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consider the likely choices of other people and take the risk of an undesirable 
candidate or party winning into account while making their voting decision.
3
 
Thus, a rational calculation is made to maximize the utility of their vote.
4
 A 
substantial body of literature has studied strategic voting in general elections in 
some industrialized democracies such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan.
5
 Furthermore, the amount of literature has been growing 
rapidly in recent years in the area of strategic voting in new democracies.
6
 
Previous studies on strategic voting have extensively dealt with the issue of 
ticket-splitting in mixed electoral systems that combine plurality or majority 
with proportional formulas for an election to a single body.
7
 However, very 
                                                                                                                   
Electoral Systems Around the World, ed. John H. Aldrich, André Blais and Laura B. 
Stephenson (University of Michigan Press, 2018), 1–27; William H. Riker, “The Two-
Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” 
American Political Science Review 76, no. 4 (1982): 753–766; Thomas Gschwend, 
Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems (PhD diss., State University of New York at 
Stony Brook, 2004), 10. 
3  Donald J. McCrone, “Identifying Voting Strategies from Roll Call Votes: A Method and 
an Application,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1977): 177–191; Rui Antunes, 
“Theoretical Models of Voting Behaviour,” Exedra, no. 4 (2010): 145–170.; David J. 
Lanoue and Shaun Bowler, “The Sources of Tactical Voting in British Parliamentary 
Elections, 1983–1987,” Political Behavior 14, no. 2 (1992): 141–157; André Blais, 
Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte, “Measuring Strategic Voting in 
Multiparty Plurality Elections,” Electoral Studies 20, no. 3 (2001): 343–352. 
4  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(London: Methuen & Co, 1954); Geoffrey Evans and Anthony Heath, “A Tactical Error 
in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin,” British 
Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1993): 131–137; Stephen D. Fisher, “Definition 
and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice,” British Journal of 
Political Science 34, no.1 (2004): 152–166.  
5  See R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “A New Approach for Modelling Strategic 
Voting in Multiparty Elections,” British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (2000): 57–
75; Bruce E. Cain, “Strategic Voting in Britain,” American Journal of Political Science 
22, no. 3 (1978): 639–655; Jennifer Earl and Alan Schussman, “Cease and Desist: 
Repression, Strategic Voting and the 2000 US Presidential Election,” Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly 9, no. 2 (2004): 181–202; Kei Kawai and Yasutora Watanabe, 
“Inferring Strategic Voting,” The American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (2013): 624–
662. 
6  See Jeremy Horowitz and James Long, “Strategic Voting, Information, and Ethnicity in 
Emerging Democracies: Evidence from Kenya,” Electoral Studies 44, (2016): 351–361; 
Pavel Maškarinec, “Strategic Voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate Elections: 
Testing Duvergerʼs Law in the Second-Order Elections,” Slovak Journal of Political 
Sciences 16, no. 4 (2016): 369–391; Pavel Maškarinec, “Testing Duvergerʼs Law: 
Strategic Voting in Mongolian Elections, 1996–2004,” Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 2 
(2017): 145–160. 
7   Louis Massicotte and André Blais, “Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical 
survey,” Electoral Studies 18, no.3 (1999): 341-366; Federico Ferrara and Erik S. Herron, 
“Going it alone? Strategic entry under mixed electoral rules,” American Journal of 
Political Science 49, no.1 (2005): 16-31; Thomas Gschwend, “Ticket‐splitting and 
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little is known about how voters react to incentives for strategic voting in 
concurrent elections, especially when new and two different electoral systems 
are used.  
The effect of the concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on 
strategic voting is still unclear. This paper aims to provide an empirical 
contribution to our understanding of how voters react to electoral incentives for 
strategic voting when presidential and parliamentary elections are held 
concurrently and under different systems. This study analyzes the incentives in 
such a setting using a case study of Turkey where both the members of the 
parliament and the president are directly and concurrently elected. If voters split 
their tickets to avoid wasting their vote and attain a more favorable outcome in 
the presidential elections, this is considered as strategic voting. Sincere voting is 
defined as voting for the same party and its presidential candidate in these 
elections. Turkey’s new electoral system serves as an ideal example to examine 
the effects of the concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections on 
strategic voting. Firstly, the new electoral laws
8
 applied in the June 2018 
elections as the first elections during the transition to executive presidential 
system combine majoritarian and proportional elements. Voters cast two ballots 
simultaneously: the first one is for a candidate in the presidential election and 
the second one is for a party or an alliance in the parliamentary election. The 
president is elected under a majoritarian system while the members of 
parliament are elected from closed party lists under a proportional 
representation system. Hence, voters cast two separate ballots concurrently in 
identical contexts but under different rules. Presidential and parliamentary 
elections held together allow us to directly examine the effect of institutional 
incentives on strategic voting in a systematic way while controlling for other 
relevant personal factors that may influence voting decisions such as age, 
gender, culture, religion and socioeconomic status.
9
 Secondly, despite the fact 
that voting was conducted under new electoral rules for concurrent presidential 
and parliamentary elections for the first time, most Turkish voters have been 
familiar with concurrent elections due to the different systems that have been 
enacted since 1963
10
 for local elections. Therefore, there is little reason to suspect 
that voters unintentionally split their ballots without any strategic reasoning. 
Despite wider discussions on the direction and size of strategic votes and 
their impact on election results after almost every election in Turkey, this topic 
                                                                                                                   
strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany,” European Journal 
of Political Research 46, no.1 (2007): 1-23. 
8  Law No. 7102, T.C. Resmi Gazete, no. 30362, March 16, 2018. 
9  Gschwend, “Ticket-splitting,” 1-23. 
10  Tayfun Çınar, “Yerel Seçimlerde Kent Büyüklüğü ile Oy Vermenin Yönü Arasındaki 
İlişki: Türkiye Örneği 1963-1999,” Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 62, no. 3 (2007): 
141–165. 
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has been surprisingly neglected for a long time by researchers of Turkish voting 
behavior. The few extant studies
11
 that are examining the determinants of 
strategic voting in local and national elections are relatively limited due to their 
use of cross-provincial data. Each unit of cross-provincial data has an electorate 
of more than half a million on average, inevitably leading to changes in vote 
shares canceling each other out because of aggregation. As a result, it is 
plausible that these limitations could have influenced the results obtained. 
Making individual-level inferences from aggregate data is required when 
individual-level data are not available. But it is also challenging because it 
generates the ecological fallacy problem due to the uncertainties and the 
information lost in aggregation. For example, although a party and its 
presidential candidate get a very similar number of votes in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, this does not necessarily mean that the people who 
voted for that party are the same people who voted in favor of that party’s 
presidential candidate. From a methodological point of view, the difficulty of 
analysis comes from the principle of the secret ballot. This voting method 
ensures that voters cast their ballots in secret and that their choices remain 
anonymous. Therefore, the lack of information about who voted for whom makes 
any method prone to ecological fallacy when making inferences about individuals. 
In this study, King’s
12
 ecological inference solution is applied to 
determine the size and direction of strategic voting in Turkey’s 2018 
presidential and parliamentary elections. This solution is well known for 
producing robust and reliable estimates.
13
 King suggests that the ecological 
inference problem can be minimized by incorporating two prevailing 
approaches in the literature: the deterministic method of bounds and the 
Goodman Regression. Firstly, the method of bounds is employed to restrict 
estimates for unknown values. After identifying all possible values for each 
observation, a tomography plot of the quantities of interest is built. The plot 
shows how flexible or constrained the parameters are, and there is a tomography 
line for each observation. The mean of the distribution on the tomography line 
                                               
11  Ali T. Akarca and Aysit Tansel, “Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An 
Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results between 1950 and 
2004,” Public Choice 129, no. 1-2 (2006): 77–105; Ali T. Akarca and Aysit Tansel, 
“Social and Economic Determinants of Turkish Voter Choice in the 1995 Parliamentary 
Election,” Electoral Studies 26, no. 3 (2007): 633–647; Ali T. Akarca, “A Prediction for 
AKP’s Nationwide Vote Share in the 29 March 2009 Turkish Local Elections,” İktisat 
İ letme ve Finans 24, no. 276 (2009): 7–22; Ali T. Akarca, “Analysis of the 2009 Turkish 
Election Results from an Economic Voting Perspective,” European Research Studies 13, 
no. 3 (2010): 3–38.  
12  Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual 
Behavior from Aggregate Data (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).  
13  Eom, Kihong and Youngjae Jin. “Inferring Individual Level Relationships from 
Aggregate Data,” Statistical Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 211-231. 
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in the interval [0, 1] is used to estimate the true parameter values. Applying this 
solution allows us to answer previously intractable questions in the field. For 
instance, we can examine what percent of voters who voted for a party in the 
parliamentary election cast their votes for that party’s candidate in the 
presidential elections. After applying this solution for every possible voting 
combination, it will allow us to infer the size and the extent of the strategic vote 
in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey. Data for the June 
2018 presidential and parliamentary elections were collected at the ballot-box 
level from all provinces in Turkey. Since this dataset consists of all ballot boxes 
nationwide (179,524 observations per election), each unit has only 270 
electorates on average, which is the smallest that is legally available. Robinson
14
 
asserted in his seminal paper that the problem of ecological fallacy becomes 
more severe when large units are involved. The number of votes per party at the 
parliamentary elections will be compared with the presidential election results 
for each ballot box. The aim is to compare the differences between the actual 
results and the results that would have been observed if all voters had voted 
sincerely. The degree to which voting behavior differs between parliamentary 
and presidential elections at the ballot-box level indicates the prevalence of 
strategic voting that would remain hidden if the data used were from the 
provincial level. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section 
provides a brief overview of Turkey’s June 2018 elections. The third section 
presents the method used in the present study and how the data were collected 
and introduces the types of strategic voting behavior that can occur under the 
new electoral system. The subsequent sections discuss the results of the analysis 
by parties and the final section concludes. 
 
 
Turkey’s June 2018  
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 
 
A narrowly backed constitutional referendum in April 2017 has brought 
about several reforms and replaced the existing parliamentary system with the 
executive presidential system. The new system abolishes the office of prime 
minister and extends the powers of the president, including powers to dissolve 
parliament, rule by decree, and declaring a state of emergency. The system was 
fully implemented after the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
which were originally scheduled for November 2019.
15
 
                                               
14  William S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,” 
American Sociological Review 15, no. 3 (1950): 351–357.  
15  Table 1 gives short descriptions of the political parties running in the 2018 elections. 
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In response to the initial proposal of Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the far-
right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [MHP]), President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called snap presidential and parliamentary elections to 
rid the old system of “diseases”
16
 and shift to the new executive presidential 
system. The early election call, which was made more than 18 months in 
advance, came amid regional uncertainty, a state of emergency, and a worsening 
economy. The Turkish Lira had been in rapid decline against the US dollar, 
inflation had been stubbornly high, and unemployment had been rising. Critics 
have interpreted Erdoğan’s call for the snap elections as a preemptive move to 
secure a new mandate before the electorate turns against the government due to 
the rapidly deteriorating economy
17
 and to catch the opposition off guard. For 
instance, the newly founded Good Party (İyi Parti [İYİ Party]) failed to fulfill 
one of the preconditions for entering the elections, which is to hold its required 
general congress more than six months prior to elections. However, 15 of the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]) deputies joined the 
İYİ Party to ensure its participation in the elections. 
The election alliance bill presented by the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) and the MHP, which changed Turkey’s 
electoral system, was ratified by parliament. It allows political parties to form 
an alliance and run with their own candidate lists and emblems for the first time. 
Moreover, if the sum of the votes of an alliance passes the ten percent threshold, 
all parties in that alliance will be considered above the threshold and thus be 
able to run in the parliamentary election. Subsequently, the ruling AKP and its 
right-wing ally, the MHP, announced their alliance and named themselves the 
People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı). The MHP agreed not to field any 
presidential candidate but to fully support AKP candidate President Erdoğan. 
The other alliance, the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı), was formed by the main 
opposition center-left CHP and three right-wing parties including the İYİ Party, 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi [SP]), and Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti 
[DP]), hoping to oust the incumbent AKP. Different from the People’s Alliance, 
this alliance only pertains to the parliamentary polls. Three partners within the 
alliance decided to nominate their own candidates for the presidential election 
but also promised to support whoever could make it to a run-off election against 
Erdoğan. The pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi [HDP]) also participated in the elections without forming an alliance. 
President Erdoğan has never lost an election since founding the AKP. He 
is by far the most popular politician in Turkey and has remained popular despite 
the faltering economy. Although Erdoğan was the definite favorite to win from 
the beginning, the presidential race was surprisingly heated, as it featured five 
other candidates. Muharrem İnce, the candidate of the main opposition party, 
the CHP, posed a serious challenge to Erdoğan. He had held a series of rallies 
                                               
16  Al Jazeera, Jun 4, 2018. 
17  Kemal Kirişci and Ömer Taşpınar, “Ahead of Turkey’s Snap Elections, Erdogan Faces 
Three Main Challenges,” Brookings (June 2018). 
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and reached out to galvanized crowds across the country. The nationalist İYİ 
Party’s candidate Meral Akşener, the Islamist SP’s candidate Temel 
Karamollaoğlu, and the leftist-nationalist Homeland Party’s (Vatan Partisi 
[VP]) candidate Doğu Perinçek ran for the presidency by collecting 100,000 
signatures each from the public, since their parties had neither received at least 
5 percent of the total votes in the last election nor had they elected 
representatives to the parliament.
18
 The pro-Kurdish HDP candidate Selahattin 
Demirtaş had to run from behind bars, as he had been detained since late 2016 
on multiple charges but without indictment. 
The 2018 Turkish general elections were held on June 24, 2018. Despite 
compulsory voting in Turkey, the turnout among registered voters was 86.2 
percent for both presidential and parliamentary elections. Compulsory voting 
combined with the rising awareness among voters that every vote counts meant 
that there was a high turnout rate, reflecting the strong public interest in the 
elections. As presented in Table 2, the incumbent President Erdoğan defeated the 
other five candidates with 52.6 percent of the vote and was elected president  in 
the first round of the presidential election. The second-strongest candidate, İnce 
of the CHP, received 30.6 percent of the vote, with Demirtaş of the HDP trailing 
behind in third place with 8.4 percent of the vote. Akşener of the İYİ came in 
fourth, with 7.3 percent of the vote. Karamollaoğlu of the SP and Perinçek of the 
VP received 0.9 and 0.2 percent of the vote, respectively. For comparison, the 
results of the last two presidential elections are given in the Table 3.  
The economic voting model argues that poorer economic performance tends 
to hurt the incumbent party’s vote share. Therefore, the AKP was expected to fail to 
maintain its share of the popular vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections despite 
performing strongly in the November 2015 general elections. The AKP secured 
42.6 percent of the vote and 295 of the 600 seats, remaining the largest party, but it 
fell just short of obtaining a parliamentary majority. Its ally, the MHP, won 49 seats 
with 11.1 percent of the vote. The CHP came in second, securing 146 seats with 
22.7 percent of the vote. Its newly formed ally the İYİ Party won 43 seats with 10 
percent of the vote. The HDP won 11.7 percent of the vote and 67 seats in 
parliament. For comparison, the results of the last three parliamentary elections are 
given in the Table 4. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Systematic analyses of strategic voting frequently devise survey designs 
that are usually highly costly to implement and low in representation by the 
                                               
18  The İYİ Party had a group in parliament after 15 deputies resigned from the CHP and 
joined them. However, Akşener decided to become a candidate by collecting signatures 
from citizens instead of being presented by her party.  
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nature of the research design.
19
 In cases where individual data are inaccessible 
or lacking, using only province-level or national-level aggregate data to make 
inferences about individual-level relationships seems appealing to political 
science researchers, although estimation at the higher aggregate levels leads to a 
substantially higher risk of committing an ecological fallacy.
20
 Therefore, this 
study aims to infer the voting behavior of individuals from low-level aggregate 
data, despite the requisite for massive data-collecting efforts and methodological 
challenges. Even if downloading all the data from the official website of the 
Supreme Election Council of Turkey (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu [YSK]) on separate 
sheets is accomplished, to perform data merging and cleaning operations for 
several thousand downloaded files can be considered as beyond the capacity of 
the average researcher. These hurdles may partially account for why the present 
study is the first to use official electoral outcomes at the ballot-box level to 
analyze Turkish voting behavior in the general elections, even though the data for 
previous elections have been made publicly available.  
The ecological inference method proposed by Gary King
21
 combines two 
prevailing approaches in the literature, which are the method of bounds and the 
Goodman regression. This approach eliminates impossible combinations of 
voting strategies using the method of bounds and then borrows statistical 
strength from the truncated multivariate normal to locate the most probable 
regions within known deterministic bounds. In this study, this approach was 
used to measure changes in vote distribution between the presidential and 
parliamentary elections for each party and candidate at the ballot-box level. 
Then, it was used to estimate the size and direction of sincere and strategic 
voting in the two elections and aggregate the data at the national level. All 
analyses in this article were performed in R by employing commands in the 
Zelig package
22
 version 3.5.3 with 100 iterations.
23
  
In the 2018 elections, a mixed electoral system was employed that 
combines proportional and majoritarian components. Voters cast two ballots 
concurrently: the first for a party or an alliance in the parliamentary election and 
the second for a candidate in the presidential election. The parliamentary 
members are elected from closed party lists for each province under a 
proportional representation system. To win seats in the parliament, parties or 
                                               
19  Luana Russo, “Estimating Floating Voters: A Comparison Between the Ecological 
Inference and the Survey Methods,” Quality & Quantity 48, no. 3 (2014): 1667–1683.  
20  King, Solution, 7.  
21  King, Solution, 26–27.  
22  Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Olivia Lau, “Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software,” R 
Package Version 3, no. 5 (2009).  
23  The complete replication code and data are available at the website Harvard Dataverse, 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QJEV1J. 
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alliances need to pass the ten percent threshold at the national level. On the 
other hand, the president is elected based on a simple majority of votes.  
Strategic voters assess the competitive viability of their most preferred 
party or candidate and decides how to vote according to the circumstances of 
the election. If the voters conclude that their most preferred party or candidate 
has no chance of winning, this provides an incentive to split their ticket to 
maximize their expected return. Although there is no consensus on what makes 
people split their vote, split voting is generally considered a result of voters’ 
reaction to the different strategic incentives provided by the electoral rules
24
 and 
accepted as a deliberate act intended to influence the outcome of the elections.
25
 
In the 2018 parliamentary elections, under proportional representation 
rules, the only incentive for strategic voting could be the electoral threshold 
stipulating that parties or alliances must receive at least 10 percent of the total 
vote. One possible strategy in the parliamentary elections could be casting a 
vote for a small party to ensure that it surpassed the threshold to gain seats in 
the parliament, a strategy which is also referred to as threshold insurance 
voting.
26
 For instance, a main opposition party supporter could have 
strategically backed a small party in the parliamentary elections to ensure that 
the party surpassed the electoral threshold, with the hope of opposition parties 
forming the majority in parliament. However, the new electoral law made 
significant changes with respect to threshold rules. The 10 percent threshold is 
still intact but if the total votes of an alliance pass the threshold, each party 
within that alliance would be eligible to claim seats in the parliament regardless 
of their own vote share. Therefore, small party voters are encouraged to support 
their party without fear of wasting their vote if their party is in one of the pre-
electoral alliances. As a result, I assume that all voters tend to vote sincerely in 
the parliamentary elections. 
Under this new electoral system, voters were more likely to vote 
strategically in the presidential elections. Here, two main strategies that can be 
considered alternatives to sincere voting are available. The first one is that if a 
voter believed their party’s presidential candidate could not win, they may have 
been tempted to vote for the ideologically closest candidate instead of “wasting” 
their vote. The other strategy is to vote for the lesser evil of the two main 
                                               
24  Fiorina Morris, Divided government (London: Longman Publishing Group, 1996); 
Gschwend, “Ticket-splitting,” 1-23. 
25  Timothy S. Rich, “Reinterpreting Split-Ticket Voting in South Korea’s 2004 Legislative 
Election: Party Identification and Impeachment Perceptions,” Asian Journal of Social 
Science 45, no. 4-5 (2017): 529-547.. 
26   Cox, Making, 194; Annika Fredén, “Threshold insurance voting in PR systems: A study 
of voters’ strategic behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election,” Journal of Elections, 
Public Opinion & Parties 24, no. 4 (2014): 473-492. 
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candidates. Abstaining could be the third strategy, but this falls outside the 
scope of this paper since this act has no effect on the results of either election. 
This study has two primary limitations which must be considered when 
interpreting the results. First, if the president was not elected in the first round 
of voting, the size of strategic voting would be expected to be higher in the 
second round because there would be only two candidates and close 
competition between the top two contenders would provide stronger incentives 
to vote strategically.
27
 The other limitation of this study is that all registered 
voters are included, and that the entire country is taken as a single electoral unit 
in order to assess the overall pattern of strategic voting in the 2018 Turkish 
elections, meaning that the results cannot show variation in strategic voting 
across the provinces.  
 
 
Electoral Results and Testing 
 
The overall results of the presidential and parliamentary elections 
indicated that the vote shares of parties did not completely coincide with the 
vote shares of the candidates supported by those parties. Even if they did, the 
overall comparison hinders a great extent of vote changes among parties and 
candidates. Applying King’s ecological inference solution using the ballot-box 
level data reveals the hidden volatility and gives us more accurate estimations 
about the amount and direction of strategic voting in the 2018 Turkish elections. 
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the percentage distribution of 
each party’s parliamentary votes according to the candidate supported in the 
presidential votes. As the candidates of their parties were the front-runners of 
this election, there was no incentive for AKP or CHP supporters to vote 
strategically. The estimates suggest that the voting patterns of AKP and CHP 
supporters for the two elections were almost identical, which implies that most 
of them voted for the same party and its candidates in both contests. Thus, as 
expected, the AKP and CHP had the highest rates of sincere voting. On average, 
only 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent of AKP and CHP supporters voted for another 
party’s candidate, respectively. 
Erdoğan had been expected to win the re-election easily, since he was 
still very popular in Turkey. This did not provide strong incentives for MHP 
supporters to vote strategically and resulted in a higher proportion of votes 
being cast for Erdoğan. A total of 84.4 percent of MHP electors voted a straight-
ticket and the rest split their tickets between different party-candidate 
                                               
27  Bernard Dolez, Annie Laurent, and André Blais, “Strategic voting in the second round of a 
two-round system: The 2014 French municipal elections,” French Politics 15, no. 1 
(2017): 27-42. 
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combinations; for example, 12.8 percent of MHP supporters defected to 
Akşener and another 2.3 percent defected to İnce. 
The only presidential candidate other than Demirtaş that HDP voters 
supported was CHP’s candidate Muharrem İnce. The estimates show that the 
10.9 percent of HDP voters switched to İnce. This can be seen as a positive 
return to CHP’s support to HDP in previous general elections to pass the 
electoral threshold. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted as voting for a 
lesser evil to beat Erdoğan in the presidential elections.  
A strategic element of SP supporters’ decision is that if they thought that 
their first choice of candidate, Karamollaoğlu, had no chance of winning, they 
may have chosen to vote for their second choice of candidate, rather than 
wasting their vote on a candidate with no chance of winning. SP voters were 
almost equally divided between Karamollaoğlu (43.5 percent) and İnce (42.3 
percent). Meanwhile, 7.9 percent supported the İYİ Party’s candidate Akşener, 
and 4.8 percent switched to Erdoğan. SP again lost a large proportion of its 
sincere vote, 56.5 percent. VP lost more, with 93.2 percent defections. 
However, that much insincere voting of VP voters can be associated with the 
party’s widespread and very low level of vote share, which resulted in higher 
levels of estimation error. Finally, it is important to note that invalid votes for 
parliamentary elections were highly correlated with Erdoğan, which means that 
a large number of voters who failed to cast a valid vote preferred Erdoğan for 
the presidency. 
Overall, 91 percent voted for the presidential candidate of the party they 
voted for in the parliamentary election, and 9 percent split their tickets. 
However, it can be argued that when computing the amount of strategic voting 
behavior in any election, we should consider only those who engage in strategic 
behavior when presented with the opportunity to do so. This leads us to a more 
accurate and significantly larger estimate of the aggregate amount of strategic 
voting among those with the opportunity to behave strategically. When AKP 
and CHP voters are excluded, the percentage of voters who switched their votes 
increases from 9 to 25 percent. Moreover, the share of the total electors who 
voted a straight ticket, according to our estimates, drops to 75 percent. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The concurrent elections, held under different systems, can shape the 
expectations of voters and create different incentives for strategic ticket-
splitting. The unique feature of these elections provides a perfect setting to 
investigate the institutional determinants of strategic voting by controlling for 
many personal factors that may influence voting decisions. This study aims to 
make an empirical contribution to our knowledge on how voters react to 
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strategic voting incentives by examining the case of Turkey’s 2018 concurrent 
presidential and parliamentary elections.  
Turkish voting behavior is known for being highly volatile, which means 
that most voters are open to changing their preferences between elections. They 
are also familiar with the concurrent nature of elections from the local elections, 
and for this reason they know how to adopt strategies that can have an impact 
on electoral results. In Turkey’s new electoral system, the concurrent presidential 
and parliamentary elections are held under different systems. The president is 
elected based on a simple majority of votes. In the parliamentary elections, the 
proportional representation system is applied, which gives a chance to more than 
one party or alliance to win seats in the parliament if they exceed the ten percent 
threshold at the national level. The new mechanism of alliances removed the need 
for strategic voting for a small party for threshold insurance. Only the HDP was 
not in any alliance and subject to a threat of national threshold, but its 
performances in the two general elections of 2015 created an expectation that it 
could pass it rather confidently. Therefore, I assume that all people vote sincerely 
under new parliamentary elections law. On the other hand, in this context, if a 
voter decides that their most preferred party’s presidential candidate has a poor 
chance of winning, they can choose an ideologically closer or a lesser evil 
candidate with the highest probability of winning. Ticket-splitting to avoid 
wasting their vote and attain a more favorable outcome in the presidential 
elections is considered as strategic voting. Sincere voting is defined as voting for 
a party and that party’s presidential candidate in both of these elections. 
Estimating the size and direction of strategic voting from aggregate data is 
quite problematic due to the problem of the ecological fallacy. This study has 
tried to overcome this problem by applying King’s ecological inference solution. 
Advanced quantitative analysis of this solution compares the differences between 
the actual results and the results that would have been observed if all voters had 
voted sincerely for each ballot box and provides us with a new dataset containing 
the estimation of the amount and direction of strategic voting. In addition to this, 
this is the first study that relies on ballot box level data rather than provincial or 
national aggregate data to determine strategic vote-splitting in Turkey. The use of 
ballot-box level data which is the smallest unit that is legally available, helps 
alleviate the problem of ecological fallacy. 
An analysis of voting behavior in Turkey’s first elections under a new 
system shows that 9 percent of total voters cast a strategic vote in the 
presidential elections. Moreover, if supporters of the two main parties, AKP and 
CHP, are excluded from the analysis because they had no reason to vote 
strategically, the percentage of strategic voters increases to 25 percent. This 
corresponds to one-fourth of voters that changed their voting preferences due to 
strategic calculations. The 12.8 percent of MHP supporters voted for IYI Party’s 
candidate Akşener and 2.3 percent voted for CHP’s candidate İnce. The 10.9 
percent of HDP and 43.5 percent of SP voters switched to İnce. The 7.9 percent 
of SP supporters voted for Akşener, and 4.8 percent switched to Erdoğan. 
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Invalid votes in the parliamentary elections are highly correlated with Erdoğan’s 
vote in the presidential election, which means that a large number of voters who 
failed to cast a valid vote preferred Erdoğan for presidency. If there were a 
second round of the presidential elections, it would be plausible to expect higher 
levels of strategic voting because a close competition between the top two 
contenders would have provided stronger incentives to vote strategically.  
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Annexes 
 
Table 1. Descriptions of the political parties running in the 2018 elections 
Party  Party Leader 
Presidential 
Candidate Description Alliance 
AKP 
Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
the right-wing conservative,  
governing party since 2002 
People 
MHP Devlet Bahçeli Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the far-right ultranationalist People 
CHP 
Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu 
Muharrem İnce 
the main opposition party, 
center-left,  
founded by Ataturk 
Nation 
IYI Meral Akşener Meral Akşener 
the right-wing nationalist,  
formed by former members of 
MHP  
Nation 
SP 
Temel 
Karamollaoğlu 
Temel Karamollaoğlu the Islamist, right-wing Nation 
HDP 
Sezai Temelli 
Pervin Buldan 
Selahattin Demirtaş  the pro-Kurdish  - 
VP Doğu Perinçek  Doğu Perinçek  the left-wing nationalist  - 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
Table 2. Results of the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey 
Party Alliance Vote % Seats Candidate  Vote % 
AKP 
People 
42.6 295 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 52.6 
MHP 11.1 49 
CHP 
Nation 
22.7 146 Muharrem İnce 30.6 
IYI 10 43 Meral Akşener 7.3 
SP 1.3 - Temel Karamollaoğlu 0.9 
HDP - 11.7 67 Selahattin Demirtaş 8.4 
VP - 0.2 - Doğu Perinçek 0.2 
HÜDAPAR - 0.3 -  
Others - 0.1 - 
Source: Based on Supreme Election Council of Turkey official data, accessed May 9, 2020, 
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/secim-arsivi/2612.  
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Table 3. Results of the Presidential Elections 
2014 2018 
Candidate Vote 
% 
Supporting 
Party 
Candidate Vote
 % 
Supporting Party 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 51.8 AKP Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
52.6 AKP, MHP 
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu 38.4 CHP, MHP Muharrem İnce 30.6 CHP 
Selahattin Demirtaş 9.8 HDP Selahattin Demirtaş 8.4 HDP 
 Meral Akşener 7.3 IYI 
Temel Karamollaoğlu 0.9 SP 
Doğu Perinçek 0.2 VP 
Source: Based on Supreme Election Council of Turkey official data, accessed May 9, 2020, 
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/secim-arsivi/2612. 
  
Table 4. Results of the Parliamentary Elections 
 Jun 2015 Nov 2015 2018 
Party Vote % Seats Vote % Seats Vote % Seats 
AKP 40.9 258 49.5 317 42.6 295 
CHP 25 132 25.3 134 22.7 146 
MHP 16.3 80 11.9 40 11.1 49 
HDP 13.1 80 10.8 59 11.7 67 
IYI - - - - 10 43 
SP 2.1 - 0.7 - 1.3 - 
Source: Based on Supreme Election Council of Turkey official data, accessed May 9, 2020, 
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/secim-arsivi/2612.  
 
Table 5. The overall pattern of strategic voting in the 2018 Turkish elections 
 
ERD İ C DEM AKŞ KAR 
PE
R Invalid 
AKP 
  
  
   Min 96.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 99.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 100.0 3.2 0.0 3.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
CHP 
  
  
   Min 0.0 91.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 0.0 99.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 0.0 100.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
HDP 
  
  
   Min 0.0 0.0 87.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Mean 0.1 10.9 88.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Max 1.6 12.6 100.0 0.6 2.1 0.5 12.1 
MHP 
  
  
   Min 72.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 84.4 2.3 0.0 12.8 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Max 100.0 16.4 0.0 27.4 5.0 1.7 2.6 
İYİ 
  
  
   Min 0.0 30.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 0.0 46.2 0.0 53.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Max 0.0 100.0 0.0 69.3 3.2 0.1 0.2 
SP 
  
  
   Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 4.8 42.3 0.0 7.9 43.5 0.4 1.1 
Max 100.0 100.0 1.2 100.0 61.7 7.3 9.0 
VP 
  
  
   Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 1.1 36.1 0.4 46.9 4.8 6.8 3.9 
Max 15.0 100.0 2.6 100.0 96.8 
30.
2 13.7 
HÜDAPAR 
  
  
   Min 68.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 94.1 0.3 0.4 2.2 1.2 0.5 1.2 
Max 100.0 8.4 2.6 24.6 14.4 3.3 7.7 
Others 
  
  
   Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 84.0 5.8 0.1 6.4 2.1 0.5 1.1 
Max 100.0 100.0 0.4 100.0 45.1 9.7 7.4 
Invalid 
  
  
   Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean 81.3 3.0 0.3 11.9 1.1 0.7 1.7 
Max 100.0 99.4 1.2 100.0 22.2 4.9 6.6 
ERD=Erdoğan; İNC=İnce; AKŞ=Akşener; DEM=Demirtaş; KAR=Karamollaoğlu; 
PER=Perinçek; Min= Minimum Percentage; Mean=Mean Percentage; Max=Maximum 
Percentage. 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the ballot-box level data by applying King’s EI 
model. Data and code are available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QJEV1J.   
 
